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Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.: Tipping Ohio's
Workers' Compensation Scale in Favor of the
Employee
"At a very early stage.... it became apparent [in Ohio] that uttering the
magic words 'intentional tortious act' was all that was necessary to bypass the
exclusiveness bar .... "I1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Ohio Supreme Court, through its holding in Brady v. Safety-
Keen Corp.,2 asserted judicial eminence to usurp legislative power by deeming
Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80 unconstitutional in toto.3 Section 4121.80,
as part of Amended Substitute Senate Bill 307,4 was the Ohio General
Assembly's response to a line of cases that attempted to establish the
circumstances under which an employee could sue an employer for intentional
tort.5 The Brady court held that such a response, as codified, conflicted with
legislative authority under Article II, Sections 34 and 35 of the Ohio
Constitution and was consequently unconstitutional. 6 As it stands today in
I 2A ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN's COMPENSATION § 68.15(b), 13-85
(1993).
2 Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
3 Id. at 724-25.
4 Act of May 23, 1986, 1986 Ohio Laws 718.
5 See Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984); Blankenship v.
Cincinnati Milacron Chems., 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982);
Delamotte v. Uniteast Div. of Midland Ross, 411 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978);
Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
Section 4121.80 was repealed by Ohio Senate Bill 192, effective December 1, 1992,
1992 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-347 (Baldwin).
6 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 728-30. Article II, § 34 provides: "Laws may be passed
fixing and regulating the hours of labor, establishing a minimum wage, and providing for
the comfort, health, safety and general welfare of all employees; and no other provision of
the constitution shall impair or limit this power." OHIO CONST. art. II, § 34.
Section 35 provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of providing compensation to workmen ... for death, injuries or
occupational disease, occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment, laws
may be passed establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution
thereto by employers .... Such compensation shall be in lieu of all other rights to
compensation, or damages, for such death, injuries, or occupational disease, and any
employer who pays the premium or compensation provided by law ... shall not be
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Ohio, recovery under workers' compensation is no longer exclusive.
Consequently, Ohio's workers' compensation system is unbalanced, with the
employee benefiting at the expense of the employer.
This Comment will trace the development of workers' compensation law in
Ohio, including a discussion of the relevant case law that led up to the
enactment of Section 4121.80. An analysis of Brady will follow, discussing the
impact the case has had and will have on workers' compensation law in Ohio.
The Comment will conclude by presenting proposals for future development of
intentional tort law in the workers' compensation arena, as well as briefly
analyzing Ohio's recent reform of its workers' compensation system and its
effect on intentional tort in the workplace.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF OHIO'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION LAW
A. Early History
At common law, before the advent of workers' compensation acts, the
master owed a very limited duty to his servant, who "was expected . . . to
accept and take upon himself all of the usual risks of the trade, together with
any unusual risks of which he had knowledge, and to relieve the employer of
any duty to protect him." 7 By 1921, practically all states had enacted some
form of workers' compensation law aimed at balancing the risks and
responsibilities between employer and employee regarding injury in the
workplace.8 The financial burden of accident losses was removed from the
employee and placed upon the employer, who subsequently transferred the
additional cost to the consumer. 9 The employer, in return, was protected by
compulsory liability insurance, spreading the burden over the entire industry. 10
liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for such death, injuries or
occupational disease.
OxIO CONsT. art. II, § 35.
7 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 568
(5th ed. 1984).
8 Id. at 573.
91d.
10 Id. For a more thorough analysis of the history and theories behind workers'
compensation law in the United States, see KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 80. See also 1
ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKmEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 1-2 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Lmv, 16
GA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Cynthia S. Miller, Note, Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron
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. Ohio's first workers' compensation system was established in 1911,11
based upon the findings of a five-member bipartisan committee created to
review the subject.' 2 Participation in the program did not become compulsory,
however, until an amendment to the Ohio Constitution was adopted in 1912.13
Prior to 1924, the Ohio Constitution did not completely eliminate an
employee's right to sue an employer at common law. Section 1465-76 of the
Ohio General Code permitted an employee to seek common-law redress if the
employer: (1) acted willfully or (2) did not comply with a specific safety
requirement.14 In 1914, an amendment to Section 1465-76 defined a willful act
as one done "knowingly and purposely, with the direct object of injuring
another." 15 Thereafter, in Gildersleeve v. Newton Steel Co., the Supreme Court
of Ohio emphasized that, to bring an action under Section 1465-76, an
employer's act must exhibit a conscious intent to inflict injury upon another. 16
The Ohio Constitution was again amended in 1924 to provide additional
compensation to employees injured as a result of specific safety violations of
employers and to abolish the "open liability" of employers. 17 Although the
court in Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp.18 viewed the 1924 amendment as an
implicit repeal of Section 1465-76, that Section was not expressly repealed until
1931.19
As a result of the changes in the Ohio Constitution, workers' compensation
was deemed to be the exclusive remedy of an employee injured in the
workplace. Regardless, Ohio courts attempted to circumvent the harshness of
the act through holdings such as Triff v. National Bronze & Alwninum Foundry
Chemical Co.: Workers' Compensation and the Intentional Tort A New Direction for Ohio,
12 CAP. U. L. REv. 287 (1982); Donald A. Nickerson, Jr., Comment, Ohio's Attempt to
Qrcwnvent the Concept of Intentional Tort-Enactment of Revised Code Section 4121.80,
16 CAP. U. L. REv. 278 (1986); Scott Washam, Comment, 77te New Workers'
Compensation Law in Ohio: Senate Bill 307 Was No Accident, 20 AKRON L. REV. 491
(1987).
11 Act of June 15, 1911, 1911 Ohio Laws 524.
12 Act of May 17, 1910, 1910 Ohio Laws 231. For a discussion on the committee's
findings, see Donald P. Wiley, Comment, Workers' Compensation in Oldo: Scope of
Employment and the Intentional Tort, 17 AKRON L. REv. 249 (1983).
13 See OhiO CONST. art. I1, § 35.
14 OHio GENT. CODE ANN. § 1465-76 (Anderson Supp. 1916).
15 Act of Feb. 17, 1914, 1914 Ohio Laws 193, 194.
16 Gildersleeve, 142 N.E. 678, 680 (Ohio 1924).
17 H.R.J. Res. 40, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1923 Ohio Laws 631; see OHIO CONST. art.
H, § 35.
18 93 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949), appeal dismissed per curiam, 91 N.E.2d
479 (Ohio), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
19 Act of Apr. 7, 1931, 1931 Ohio Laws 26, 39.
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Co.20 In Triff, an employee died after contracting an occupational disease
which was not provided for by the legislature under the Workers'
Compensation Act. The court held that employees could sue their employer at
common law if the injury was not compensable under workers'
compensation. 21 Accordingly, the Tiff decision invoked an amendment to
existing law, bringing occupational diseases within the Act and restoring the
exclusivity doctrine.22
In 1959, the legislature opened the door for judicial destruction of
exclusivity by amending Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.7423 to read in part:
"received or contracted by any employee in the course of or arising out of his
employment." 24 Subsequently, courts used the amended language to formulate
exceptions to exclusivity, 25 culminating in the ultimate blow to workers'
compensation: the intentional tort exception set forth in Blankenship v.
Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals, Inc.26 and elucidated in Jones v. VIP
Development Co27
B. Cases Leading to Enactment of Section 4121.80
The issue before the court in Blankenship was whether the trial court
properly dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint on the grounds that Article II,
Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution barred employees from bringing an action
at law against their employer for intentional tort.28 The court found that Ohio
law did not expressly grant immunity to employers from actions alleging
20 20 N.E.2d 232 (Ohio 1939).
21 Washam, supra note 10, at 498.
22 Act of May 26, 1939, 1939 Ohio Laws 422. Court decisions reached after the 1939
amendment illustrate how strictly the judiciary adhered to the exclusivity doctrine. In Bevis
v. Armco Steel Corp., 93 N.E.2d at 37 (Ross, J., concurring), the court did not allow a
common law action against an employer whose intentional misrepresentation aggravated a
disease contracted by an employee in the course of employment. See also Greenwalt v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 128 N.E.2d 116 (Ohio 1955), overrded by Vandemark v.
Southland Corp., 525 N.E.2d 1374 (Ohio 1988).
23 Act of Aug. 19, 1959, 1959 Ohio Laws 1334.
24 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1992).
25 See Delamotte v. Unitcast Div. of Midland Ross, 411 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. App.
1978) (common law action against employer who fraudulently withheld information
concerning employee's contracting of silicosis); Mercer v. Uniroyal, 361 N.E.2d 492 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976) (common law action against employer where hazard is one common to the
public and not unique to employment situation).
26 433 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1982).
27 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984).
28 Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 575.
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intentional tort.29 Furthermore, the court held that an injury occurring as a
result of an intentional tort does not arise out of the course of employment and,
subsequently, does not fall under the employer immunity umbrella established
by Section 4123.74.30
Jones v. VIP Development Co. further scrutinized the role of the intentional
tort in the workers' compensation arena and resolved a number of issues left
open by the Blankenship court. First, the court defined an intentional tort as
"an act committed with the intent to injure another or commited with the belief
that such injury is substantially certain to occur." 31 It specifically rejected the
argument that a specific intent to injure is an essential element to an intentional
tort, holding, alternatively, that intent may be implied when an "actor proceeds
despite a perceived threat of harm to others which is substantially certain, not
merely likely, to occur."32
The court also held that receipt of workers' compensation benefits does not
bar employees from maintaining a common-law action against their employer
based on intentional tort or receiving damages therefrom. 33 Finally, the court
stated that an employer found liable for an intentional tort is not entitled to a
set-off of damages based on the amount of workers' compensation benefits
received by the employee.34 The court denied that its decision would result in a
double recovery of damages, holding that an intentional tort award is
supplemental to an award under the Act.35
As one commentator noted, the liberal construction policy of the court in
both Blankenship and Jones sparked heated debate in legal, business, and
industrial communities. 36 The strongest debate and subsequent reaction,
however, came from the General Assembly as part of Amended Substitute
Senate Bill 307. 3 7
C. The Legislative Response Pre-Brady
In August 1986, a new section of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with
workers' compensation claims became effective. Essentially, Section 4121.80
29 Id. at 576.
30 Id.
3 1 Jones, 472 N.E.2d at 1051 (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965)).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1055.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Washam, supra note 10, at 505.
37 Act of May 23, 1986, 1986 Ohio Laws 718.
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created a statutory cause of action for employees injured as a result of the
intentional torts of their employers.38 While codifying an employee's right to
avoid the exclusivity of workers' compensation in a limited number of
circumstances, the statute also placed limitations on the employee that were not
present at common law.39 Specifically, these limitations included: (1) a set-off
provision for an excess of damages received or receivable under the Act, 40 (2)
a requirement that the determination of damages in intentional tort cases against
employers be set by the Industrial Commission and not a jury,41 and (3) a state-
managed tort fund from which all damage awards are to be paid to employees
successful in intentional tort suits against their employers. 42
In its first opportunity to discuss the viability of Section 4121.80, the Ohio
Supreme Court in Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.43 deemed the statute
unconstitutional in toto.
III. BRADY V. SAFETY-KLEEN CORP.
A. The Facts
Mike 0. Brady was a truck driver for Safety-Kleen Corporation. 44 Among
his duties was the hauling of hazardous materials to and from Safety-Kleen's
recycling facility.45 On July 24, 1987, Brady and several co-workers were in
two trucks traveling through Pennsylvania en route to the recycling facility.46
The truck ahead of Brady spilled perchloroethylene which subsequently
splashed onto Brady's windshield. 47 Brady claimed thereafter that he was
exposed to phosgene gas which was produced when the perchloroethylene came
in contact with the exhaust manifold of Brady's truck.48 He was diagnosed with
progressive fibrosis of the lungs and a restrictive lung disease precipitated by
38 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80 (repealed 1992). For an in-depth analysis of
Section 4121.80, see Douglas L. Hertlein, Comment, Intentional Torts by Employers in
Ohio, The General Assembly 's Solution: Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80, 56 U. GIN. L.
REv. 247 (1987); Nickerson, supra note 10; Washam, supra note 10.
39 Hertlein, supra note 38, at 247.
40 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
41 OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
42 OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(E) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
43 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
44 Id. at 723.
45 Id.
46 Id.
4 7 Id. Perchloroethylene is a dry cleaning agent. Id.
48 Id.
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scarring in his lungs, conditions medically determined to be a direct result of
his exposure to the gas on July 24, 1987. 49
Brady filed a complaint in federal court alleging, inter alia, that the injuries
he sustained were a direct and proximate result of Safety-Kleen's intentionally
tortious conduct.50 Thereafter, Safety-Kleen filed a motion for summary
judgment on the pleadings, claiming that it was immune from liability under
Ohio's workers' compensation law.51 Finding that the complaint set forth a
properly pleaded intentional tort cause of action, the trial court overruled the
motion. 52
Brady also requested a jury trial. 53 Safety-Kleen filed a motion to strike
both the claim for damages and the request for a jury trial with regard to the
intentional tort on the grounds that both were prohibited under Ohio Revised
Code Section 4121.80.54 In response, Brady asserted that Ohio Revised Code
Section 4121.80 violated his rights to a jury trial and to equal protection. 55
Upon review of the parties' briefs, the trial court issued an order holding
Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80 constitutional and declaring that diversity
jurisdiction did not exist in the case because the State of Ohio, as custodian of
the Intentional Tort Fund, was the real party defendant in interest.56
Regardless, the cause was certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio to determine




The supreme court endeavored to determine if Section 4121.80, as a
whole, transcended the boundaries of legislative power under the Ohio
Constitution.58 The court ultimately held that Section 4121.80 exceeded and
49 Id. at 722.
50 Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 710 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. Ohio 1989).







58 Id. at 728.
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conflicted with the authority granted to the General Assembly under two
provisions of the constitution and was, thus, unconstitutional in toto.59
First, the court found Section 4121.80 totally repugnant to Article II,
Section 34.60 It agreed with Brady that the statute did not promote the health
and safety of employees. 61 Because Section 4121.80 attempted to remove the
right to a remedy under common law that would otherwise benefit the
employee, it was in direct violation with the law that mandated the furtherance
of the general welfare of all employees. 62
Next, the court examined Section 4121.80 in light of Article II, Section
35.63 Citing its opinion in Blankenship,64 the court reaffirmed that the
protection afforded employees under workers' compensation is for negligent,
not intentional, conduct. 65 Further, adopting the analysis set forth by Justice
Douglas in his dissent to the majority opinion in Taylor v. Academy Iron &
Metal Co.,66 the court found that the legislature cannot constitutionally enact
legislation governing intentional torts that occur within the employment
relationship because such conduct necessarily will always take place outside of
the scope of employment.67 Therefore, any attempt to regulate intentionally
tortious acts occurring within the workplace is beyond the scope of legislative
power granted under Article II, Section 35. 68
59 Id. at 730.
60 Id. at 728; see OHIO CONST. art. HI, § 34.
61 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 728.
62 Id.
63 Id.; see OHIo CONST. art. II, § 35.
64 See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
65 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 729.
66 522 N.E.2d 464 (Ohio 1988).
67 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 729 (quoting Taylor, 522 N.E.2d at 476 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Douglas stated in part:
Injuries resulting from an employer's intentional torts, even though committed at the
workplace, are utterly outside the scope of the purposes intended to be achieved by
Section 35 and by the Act. Such injuries are totally unrelated to the fact of employment.
When an employer intentionally harms his employee, that act effects a complete breach
of the employment relationship, and for purposes of the legal remedy for such an
injury, the two parties are not employer and employee, but intentional tortfeasor and
victim. . . . The employer has forfeited his status as such and all the attendant
protections fall away. . . . Section 35 concerns itself solely with compensation for
injuries arising from employment. R.C. 4121.80 concerns itself solely with injuries
which by their nature have no connection whatsoever with the fact of employment.
Taylor, 522 N.E.2d at 476 (citations omitted).
68 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 729.
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2. Concurring Opinions
Justice Douglas wrote separately to address the constitutionality of the
various parts of Section 4121.80. Section 4121.80(D) placed a cap on damages
recoverable by an employee claiming intentionally tortious conduct by his
employer. 69 Justice Douglas argued that, as a result, employees were treated
differently from other victims of intentional torts solely because of their
status.7° He noted that reasonable grounds must exist in order to create a
special category of intentionally injured employees within the class of all
intentional tort victims. 7 1 Because he found no reason for creating the
subcategory, Justice Douglas concluded that Section 4121.80(D) violated the
right of equal protection guaranteed in Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio
Constitution.72
Justice Douglas also found Section 4121.80(D) to be in violation of Article
I, Section 5 of the constitution which guarantees the right to a trial by jury.73
He believed that Section 4121.80(C)(2) could secure a jury trial on the issue of
liability. It was clear to him, however, that Section 4121.80(D), by requiring
the Industrial Commission to determine damages, deprived employees of their
constitutional rights.74 He also found Section 4121.80 as a whole to be in
violation of Article I, Section 16 of the constitution which guarantees every
person access to all courts to seek a remedy for injury.75
Although Justice Brown agreed with the result of the majority opinion, he
wrote separately because he felt that the legislature could modify intentional
tort law through its exercise of police power.76 Therefore, he believed it
necessary to go beyond the analysis of the majority opinion to test Section
4121.80 against other constitutional provisions. 77
69 Id. at 730 (Douglas, J., concurring).
70 Id.
71 Id. (quoting Porter v. Oberlin, 205 N.E.2d 363 (Ohio 1965)).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. Section 4121.80(C)(2) stated that the "court" may dismiss an action "[u]pon a
timely motion for a directed verdict against the plaintiff if after considering all the evidence
and every inference legitimately and reasonably raised thereby m6st favorably to the
plaintiff, the court determines that there is not sufficient evidence to find the facts required
to be proven." OinoREv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(C)(2) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
75 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 731.
76 Id. at 733; cf. State ax rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602 (Ohio 1912).
77 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 733.
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He agreed with Justice Douglas that Section 4121.80 violated the right to
trial by jury.78 He also agreed that the damage cap provision of Section
4121.80(D) was unconstitutional. 79 He expanded on this notion by stating that,
even if the need to limit damages was to survive the rational basis test, it would
probably fail on equal protection grounds. 80
3. The Dissent
Justice Holmes vehemently opposed the majority opinion. 81 First, he
argued that disagreement over the wisdom of the policy embodied by the
legislature's enactment of Section 4121.80 had no bearing on its
constitutionality.82 Because he believed that Brady did not show that Section
4121.80 was clearly incompatible with Article II, Section 34 of the Ohio
Constitution, Justice Holmes concluded that the challenge to the statute's
constitutionality should fail. 83
Justice Holmes next addressed the validity of Section 4121.80 under
Article 19, Section 35 of the constitution. 84 He found it absurd that the majority
should rely on the dissent in Taylor or adopt the Blankenship view that an
intentional tort does not arise in the course of employment but necessarily
occurs outside of an employment relationship. 85 Rather, Justice Holmes relied
on the language in Industrial Commission v. Ahern,86 which defines the terms
"in the course of employment" under Article II, Section 35 as "an injury
sustained in the performance of some required duty done directly or
incidentally in the service of the employer." 87 Therefore, under a broad
78 Id.
79 Id. at 734.
80 Id. (citing Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991); Carson v. Maurer, 424
A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Wright v. Central
DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (IMl. App. Ct. 1976)).
81 Chief Justice Moyer concurred with Justice Holmes' dissent. Justice Wright
concurred for the most part, but, unlike Justice Holmes, he agreed with the ultimate
decision in Blankenship. Id. at 745.
82 Id. at 739. Justice Holmes relied on State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602
(Ohio 1912), and Central Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union Local 208, 524
N.E.2d 151 (Ohio 1988), as authorities for the proposition that legislative power under
Article I, Section 34 of the Ohio Constitution should be broadly construed.
83 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 740.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 741.
86 162 N.E. 272 (Ohio 1928).
87 Brady, 576 N.E.2d at 741 (quoting Industrial Comm'n v. Ahern, 162 N.E. at
paragraph two of the syllabus).
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interpretation, any injury occurring in the workplace is compensable, including
an intentional injury, and a statute so allowing is constitutional. 88
Justice Holmes went on to discuss other constitutional challenges. As for
equal protection, he argued that there is no constitutional requirement that
workers' compensation claimants who are intentional tort victims be treated the
same as all other intentional tort victims.8 9 Furthermore, the legislature is
entitled to balance the interests of employers as against employees through
regulation where, as in this case, it has a legitimate interest.90
On the issue of open courts, Justice Holmes stated that Section 4121.80 did
not violate the Article I, Section 16 guarantee of open courts and the right to a
remedy. 91 Relying on State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, he argued that, through
enactment of workers' compensation laws, workers consented to forego
common-law causes of action in exchange for statutory protection. 92 If
anything, Section 4121.80 improved a worker's chances of obtaining a remedy
for an intentional tort claim. 93
Finally, Justice Holmes argued that Section 4121.80(D), by conferring
upon the Industrial Commission the power to determine damages, did not
violate the right to a jury trial. 94 The constitutionality of this provision is
further evidenced by the fact that there is no federal guarantee to a jury trial in
the remedy stage of a civil proceeding.95 Further, Justice Holmes pointed out
that the right to a jury trial is not applicable in an administrative proceeding. 96
88 Id. Justice Holmes noted that the facts showed that Brady allegedly sustained his
injuries while he was driving a truck and employed by Safety-Kleen to do precisely what he
was doing when exposed to the perchloroethylene. Therefore, he was injured "in the
course of employment." Id.
89 Id. at 743.
9 0 1d.
91 Id.
92 Id. (citing State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602, 607 (Ohio 1912)).
93 Id. Justice Holmes went on to argue that the cap on damages provided for in
Section 4121.80 also did not violate equal protection. Id. at 744. He believed that, while
the statute places a limit on damages, not compensation, it is part of an overall scheme
allowing employees to recover benefits on a no-fault basis. Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)).
96 Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Constitutionality Under Article I, Section 34 of the Ohio Constitution
A number of inadequacies exist in the court's reasoning that Section
4121.80 was unconstitutional under Article II, Section 34 of the Ohio
Constitution. The majority's premise was that, because Section 4121.80
removed an employee's right of redress from the common-law system, it
necessarily abrogated the general welfare protection of Section 34.97 The same
argument could be made for the workers' compensation system as a whole.
Ohio Revised Code Section 4123.74, which codifies workers' compensation,
states in part: "Employers who comply with Section 4123.35 of the Revised
Code shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for
any injury, or occupational disease, or bodily condition, received or contracted
by any employee in the course of or arising out of employment .. .. " 9s
Certainly, this is a legislative enactment which attempts to remove a right to a
remedy under common law that would otherwise benefit the employee. It must
be noted, however, that the constitutionality of workers' compensation laws in
Ohio was upheld in 1912. 99
Perhaps the court should have elaborated on the notion that, while
removing the right to a remedy through negligence actions promotes the safety
and health of the worker, restricting the right to remedy through intentional tort
does not. 10° The court did not cite any statistics supporting its conclusion that
regulating intentional torts between employee and employer fails to enhance the
well-being of the employee. In fact, the rationale behind workers'
compensation in general is to provide a quid pro quo: employees give up their
right to seek a common-law remedy against their employer in return for a
guaranteed and speedy recovery, without the complications of a formal
lawsuit.101 Without specifying how Section 4121.80 digressed from this
theory, the Brady court too quickly dismissed it under Section 34. If the court's
97 Id. at 728.
98 OIo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Anderson 1991 & Supp. 1992).
99 See State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 97 N.E. 602 (Ohio 1912).
1 00 Whether the institution of a workers' compensation system actually affects the well-
being of the worker is questionable according to the 1972 report of the National
Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws. The Commission found that the
overall safety record of an employer is not measurably affected by increased workers'
compensation insurance costs. NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS, REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 39
(1972).
101 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
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rationale is taken literally, it, in essence, holds workers' compensation itself
unconstitutional.
B. Constitutionality Under Article 1, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution
It is also not altogether clear from the court's brief teasoning why Section
4121.80 was unconstitutional under Article II, Section 35. The court's basic
contention was that injuries from intentional torts do not fall within those
"occasioned in the course of employment" as set forth in the Ohio
Constitution. 102 Therefore, the attempt to include intentional torts in the
workers' compensation scheme by way of Section 4121.80 was
unconstitutional.10 3 The contention, however, is not ironclad.
The court conveniently mentioned, but then disregarded, the traditional
approach on review of legislative acts. According to Bishop v. Hybud
Equipment Corp.,104 two rules of statutory construction must be applied. First,
a court is bound, whenever possible in interpreting a statute, to preserve its
constitutionality.105 In keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, a
court should presume the constitutionality of a legislative enactment, and that
presumption should be overcome in only the most extreme instances.' 0 6 There
is no indication in Brady that the court deferred in the least to the intent or
authority of the General Assembly.
Second, when a statute is susceptible to two meanings, one constitutional
and one not, courts are bound to give the statute that construction which would
uphold its validity. 10 7 Article II, Section 35 covers those injuries arising in the
course of employment. There is a valid argument that an intentional injury
sustained by an employee while performing work-related duties occurs in the
course of employment. According to the court in Industrial Commission v.
Ahem,' 0 s under Article II, Section 35, "in the course of employment" connotes
an injury contracted "in the performance of some required act done directly or
indirectly in the service of the employer." 10 9 Instead of adopting this position
and upholding the constitutionality of that aspect of Section 4121.80, however,
1020Omo CO sT. art. H1, § 35.
103 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
104 536 N.E.2d 694 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
105 Id. at 697; see also United Air Lines Inc. v. Porterfield, 276 N.E.2d 629 (Ohio
1971); State v. Meyer, 470 N.E.2d 156 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
106 Central Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union Local 208, 524 N.E.2d
151, 156 (Ohio 1988).107 Bishop, 536 N.E.2d at 697.
108 162 N.E. 272 (Ohio 1928).
109 Id. at 274.
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the court chose to adopt the dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas in Taylor v.
Academy Iron & Metal Co. 110 As a result, it adopted the alternative view that a
workers' compensation injury arises out of employment. Thus, the court
concluded that an intentional tort necessarily severs the employment
relationship.III
C. The Results of the Holding
1. Double Recovery
Section 4121.80(A) stated that employees, if successful in an intentional
tort case against their employer, have the right to recover workers'
compensation benefits and tort damages in excess of the amount "received or
receivable under Chapter 4123." 112 In deeming Section 4121.80
unconstitutional in toto, the Supreme Court of Ohio has subjected employers to
the possibility of double damages for intentional tort. The result is both
inequitable and illogical. First, as one commentator noted, "to allow a double
recovery would violate the purpose of the workers' compensation system and
would place an insurmountable burden on the employer." 113 Employers would
continue to pay workers' compensation premiums yet still be responsible for
the additional cost and possible damage award arising from a common-law
proceeding. 114 Although the ultimate solution to this problem, the election of
remedies, 115 is arguably inequitable for employees, rejecting the supplemental
110 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
consequences of this view see infra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
I"1 Taylor, 162 N.E. at 274.
112 Oo REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(A) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
113 Miller, supra note 10, at 310.
114 Id.
115 For a discussion on election of remedies, see John C. West, Comment, In the
Wake of Blankenship: Following Footprints into tire Mire of Intentional Torts in tie
Workplace in Ohio, 12 N. KY. L. REV. 267 (1985). West claims that employees "should
not be put to an election, because this would make a suit at law a paper remedy
unobtainable by virtually all injured employees." Id. at 293. He also inquires:
In a practical sense, can the claimant really be held to his election? There are
generally three prerequisites to the application of the election doctrine. These are the
existence of two or more remedies, the inconsistency of the remedies, and a choice of
one of them. Without benefit of counsel can the average employee make an informed
choice of remedy? Would the average employee be aware that he may be making an
election when he filed a claim for compensation?
[Vol. 54:819
OHIO'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION SCALE
theory set forth in Section 4121.80(A) creates an insurmountable burden on
employers.
According to the court's reasoning, an employer's intentionally tortious
conduct cannot arise out of the employment relationship. 1 6 Hence, any attempt
to regulate such conduct is unconstitutional. 117 By allowing an employee to
recover benefits for a workers' compensation claim and full damages in tort
regardless of the benefits received, however, the court is implying that the
injury was both accidental and intentional. In Ritchie v. Dravo Corp.,1I8 the
federal district court found that because the "plaintiff has already been
compensated for his injury under workers' compensation, and since an award
under workers' compensation necessarily means that plaintiff's injury arises out
of or was received in the course of his employment.., his injury cannot be
the result of the intentional tortious conduct of his employer." 119 As noted, one
solution to this inconsistency is the election of remedies theory, arguably
acrimonious to the employee. Another solution is the illogical result of Brady
which is clearly detrimental to employers. The only balance between the two
extremes was the supplemental proposition of Section 4121.80(A).
2. The Unbalancing of the Workers' Compensation Scale
Brady also represents a disruption of the quid pro quo theory embodied in
the workers' compensation system. In attempting to strike a balance between
the injured worker and the employer, the court eliminated the certainty and
predictability aspects of workers' compensation.' 20 Without Section 4121.80,
an employee's remedies for intentional tort revert back to the common-law
courts-a system of justice that proved to be so inequitable and inefficient for
both employees and employers that a statutory scheme of recovery, workers'
compensation, was implemented to provide relief. In Brady, the supreme court
destroyed the balance which is the foundation of the workers' compensation
system. 121 The employee loses the right to a guaranteed, speedy recovery. The
Id. at 279-80 (citing 25 AM. JuR. 2D Election of Remedies §§ 8, 22, 23 (1966 & Supp.
1984)).
116 Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ohio 1991).
117 Id.
118 585 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
119 Id. at 1456.
120 Wiley, supra note 12, at 259.
121 At least one commentator advocates that any modification in the quid pro quo of
workers' compensation should come only from the legislature. Helga L. Leftwich, The
Intentional-Tort Exception to the Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Immunity
Prov4sion: Woodson v. Rowland, 70 N.C. L. REV. 849, 884-87 (1992).
19931
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[l
employer loses not only its immunity from common-law redress but must
compensate the employee during the intentional tort litigation, without an
offsetting reduction in damage liability.
3. A Definition of Intent Open to Interpretation and Misapplication
In Brady, the court rejected the Section 4121.80 definition of "intentional
tort," adopting instead the Jones definition which states that "an intentional tort
is an act committed with the intent to injure another, or committed with the
belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur."122 Most courts adhere
to the position that only specific allegations of provable intent to injure will
suffice for intentional tort recovery.' 23 As Professor Larson noted, "[t]he
intentional removal of a safety device or toleration of a dangerous condition
may... set the stage for an accidental injury later. But... it cannot be said,
if such injury does happen, that this was deliberate infliction of harm
comparable to an intentional left jab to the chin." 124 Apparently, courts do not
employ the "substantially certain" test for the simple reason that it is so
difficult to construe and apply.
In order for the substantial certainty test to constitute a workable standard,
it must be applied by narrow application.' 25 Ohio courts, however, have
misconstrued "substantially certain" into a standard whereby negligence cases
are transformed into intentional tort cases.126 As Professor Larson noted:
Since the legal justification for the common-law action is the nonaccidental
character of the injury from the defendant employer's standpoint, the common-
law liability of the employer cannot, under the almost unanimous rule, be
stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, wilful,
deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of
122 jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1051 (Ohio 1984).
123 Edward J. O'Connell, Jr., Comment, Intentional Enqployer Misconduct and
Pennsylvania's Exclusive Remedy Rule After Poyser v. Newman & Co.: A Proposal for
Legislative Reform, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1127, 1148 (1988) (citing Hulne v. International
Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.D. 1980); Mingachous v. CBS, 491 A.2d 368
(Conn. 1985); Handley v. Unarco Indus., 463 N.E.2d 1011 (111. App. Ct. 1984); Tribbett v.
Tay Mor Indus., 471 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Leonard v. All-Pro Equities, Inc.,
386 N.W.2d 159 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
124 LARSON, supra note 1, § 68.13, 13-71.
125 See generally Nickerson, supra note 10, at 292-95.
126 Id. at 292 (citing Bradfield v. Stop-N-Go Foods, Inc., 477 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio 1985)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of a conscious and deliberate
intent directed to the purpose of inflicting an injury.127
To avoid the danger of differing interpretations, "intentional tort" must be
codified, as was the case before Brady.
D. Alternative Solutions
1. Right to Set-Off
One way to arrive at some kind of compromise between Brady and Section
4121.80 is to allow a set-off for compensation paid to employees in intentional
tort cases. Under a set-off theory, past benefits paid would be subject to being
set-off against a judgment for the employee. Additionally, future benefits would
be reduced to present value and similarly set-off.' 28 This would allow an
employee to pursue both statutory and common-law remedies, with the
possibility of receiving: (1) workers' compensation benefits or (2) punitive
damages. In addition, the employer, if innocent of intentional tort charges, is
protected by the insurance scheme of workers' compensation. If guilty, the
employer is liable for punitives but also maintains the protection that exists
under workers' compensation. Hence, the balance is regained and double
recovery is eliminated.
2. Damages Limit
Set-off of damages was an idea adamantly opposed in Jones,129 which was
affirmed by Brady. An alternative solution was the one established in Section
4121.80(D): a limit on damages for intentional tort.' 30 In his Brady
127 LARsON, supra note 1, §§ 68.13, 13-12, -13 (citations omitted).
128 See generally West, supra note 115, at 280-82.
129 Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d at 1055.
130 Section 4121.80(D) stated in relevant part:
Mhe commission shall consider the compensation and benefits payable under Chapter
4123. of the Revised Code and the net financial loss to the employee caused by the
employer's intentional tort. In no event shall the total amount to be received by the
employee or his estate from the intentional tort award be less than fifty per cent of no
more than three times the total compensation receivable pursuant to Chapter 4123. of
the Revised Code, but in no event may an award under this section exceed one million
dollars.
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concurrence, however, Justice Douglas argued that the cap on damages was
violative of the equal protection guarantee of Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio
Constitution. 131 Perhaps, instead of capping damages per se, Ohio could follow
the lead of some state statutes which provide for a specified percentage increase
in the employer's compensation benefits for various types of employer
misconduct. 132 The advantages to this approach are twofold. One, it keeps the
entire case within the workers' compensation system, so as to maintain the quid
pro quo previously discussed. 133 Two, according to one commentator, it
"protects the system against the indirect erosion that occurs when the intent
requirement is attenuated to include mental states that are insufficient to support
either criminal punishment or... punitive damages." 134
3. Intent Requirement
As Justice Douglas also suggested, the "intent" requirement of Section
4121.80(G) is ambiguous. 135 The legislature must specify whether specific
intent is required to sue under workers' compensation or whether conduct that
is substantially certain to cause injury will suffice. There are advantages and
disadvantages to both definitions. The specific intent requirement, as set forth
in the workers' compensation laws of West Virginia, 136 removes from
consideration all occurrences of an accidental nature, thereby protecting against
frivolous lawsuits. If such a definition were adopted, intentional torts must
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(D) (repealed 1992).
131 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
132 Joseph H. King, Jr., 77w Exclusiveness of an Enmloyee's Workers' Compensation
Remedy Against His Employer, 55 TENN. L. REv. 405, 442 (1988) (citing LARSON, supra
note 1, §§ 69.00-.22, 69.24-70.20). Ohio already incorporates such a remedy in cases of
violations of safety regulations in the workplace. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
134 Epstein, supra note 10, at 814.
135 Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 731 (Ohio 1991). Justice Douglas
was referring to the intentional tort requirement of Section 4121.80(G) which stated:
As used in this section:
(1) "Intentional tort" is an act committed with the intent to injure another or
committed with the belief that the injury is substantially certain to occur.
"Substantially certain" means that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause
an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death.
OmoREv. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G) (Anderson 1991) (repealed 1992).
136 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(C)(2)(i) (Supp. 1992).
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necessarily fall outside of workers' compensation. Thereafter, the rationale
behind workers' compensation-guaranteed and speedy recovery in return for
waiver of common-law rights-would be destroyed.
Alternatively, the "substantially certain to occur" requirement protects the
employee in the frequent circumstances involving deliberate maintenance of
hazardous work conditions and concealment of workplace dangers. Arguably,
such a definition could be maintained within the workers' compensation system
so as to sustain the quid pro quo. This would, however, involve compensating
employers for the immunity they are relinquishing-perhaps by limiting
damages in cases of proven intentional tort or mandating a narrow application
of the intentional tort definition.
Regardless of the definition finally approved, it should be set forth by the
legislature that originally formulated the workers' compensation scheme. By
establishing a solid definition with directions as to its applicatidn, the
legislature can eliminate the opportunity for misapplication and varied
interpretations.
V. OHIO AMENDED SUBSTITUTE HOUSE BILL 107
On July 21, 1993, Ohio Governor George Voinovich signed Amended
Substitute House Bill 107 into law, effectively overhauling Ohio's workers'
compensation system. 137 Although neither representatives of employers nor
employees are completely satisfied with the result, the law, as stated by State
Representative Jo Ann Davidson, house minority leader, is a "'first step toward
reform. This bill lays the foundation for further steps.'"' 138 While the bill is not
nearly as comprehensive as former Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80, its
treatment of "intentional tort" warrants discussion.
Section 2745.01 of the bill, the only provision dealing directly with the
rights of employees to bring an action against their employer for an intentional
tort, states in pertinent part:
(A) An employer is subject to liability to an employee or the dependent
survivors of a deceased employee in a civil action for damages for an
employment intentional tort.
(B) An employer is liable under this Section only if an employee or the
dependent survivors of a deceased employee who bring the action prove by
137 Act of July 21, 1993, 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-865, 5-882 (Baldwin) (to be
codified at Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01).
138 Alan Johnson, No Side Completely Happy with New Law Workers' Compensation,
CoLuMBus DISPATCH, July 22, 1993, at 3B.
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clear and convincing evidence that the employer deliberately committed all of
the elements of an employment intentional tort.
(D) As used in this Section:
(1) "Employment Intentional Tort" means an act committed by an
employer in which the employer deliberately and intentionally
injures, causes an occupational disease, or death of a specific
employee.
(2) "Employer" means any person who employs an individual.
(3) "Employee" means any individual employed by an employer.
(4) "Employ" means to permit or suffer to work. 139
Clearly, this provision is far less extensive than former Section 4121.80. It
represents, however, the Ohio legislature's first attempt to address the issue of
intentional tort in the workplace after Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.140
The significance of Section 2745.01 lies in its definition of "intentional
tort," and its clarification of the standard required to prove an intentional tort
in the workplace. Unlike the "substantially certain to occur" language of Brady
and Jones v. VIP Development Co.,141 Section 2745.01 requires that it be
shown that the employer deliberately committed an intentional tort.142 As
stated, this certain yet stringent language has the potential of discouraging
frivolous lawsuits against employers. 143
Perhaps what makes the employment intentional tort reform so interesting,
however, is the requirement that employees or their representatives "prove by
clear and convincing evidence" that the employer committed an intentional
tort.144 Supposedly, the Ohio legislature formulated such a high burden of
proof so as to make it more difficult for employees to file suit against
employers. 145 It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court of Ohio, so
quick to strike the intentional tort elements contained in Ohio Revised Code
Section 4121.80, will approve the stricter "clear and convincing" standard.
139 Act of July 21, 1993, 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-865, 5-882 (Baldwin) (to be
codified at Oio REv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(B)).
140 576 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 1991).
141 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984).
142 Act of July 21, 1993, 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-865, 5-882 (Baldwin) (to be
codified at OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(B)).
143 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
144 Act of July 21, 1993, 1993 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-865, 5-882 (Baldwin) (to be
codified at O-oREv. CODE ANN. § 2745.01(B)).
145 See David Adams, Workers' Comp Package OK'D Lmmakers Reach Agreement
on Refonrs, Including Caims Processing System, Standard Fees for Doctors, AKRON
BEAcoN J., July 21, 1993, at C6.
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Indeed, chances that the new "employment" intentional tort standard will
survive scrutiny by the Ohio Supreme Court is questionable. Specifically,
consider Justice Douglas's argument that Section 4121.80(D) was violative of
Ohio's Equal Protection Clause:
Solely because a victim is an "employee," such victim is treated differently
from other victims of intentional torts. This creates a special category of
intentional tort victims within the class of all victims of intentional torts and to
meet constitutional muster, such "[legislation must apply alike to all persons
within a class, and reasonable grounds must exist for making a distinction
between those within and those without a designated class." It is difficult to see
what legitimate interest the state has (and I find none) in treating victims of
intentional torts by employers differently from all other intentional tort
victims. 146
Although Justice Douglas was referring to the unconstitutionality of the cap on
intentional tort damages, his analysis could also apply to Amended Substitute
House Bill 107's new "employment" intentional tort definition. After all,
Section 2745.01 of the bill clearly distinguishes between an intentional tort that
occurs in the workplace (a special category) and the entire "substantially
certain" class of intentional torts.
Although the more definite definition of intentional tort contained in
Amended Substitute House Bill 107 is a step in the right direction, the Ohio
legislature's failure to limit the damages recoverable from a successful
intentional tort suit is inexcusable. Because Section 2745.01 does not prohibit
the receipt of benefits under workers' compensation where damages are
awarded in an intentional tort action, the employer is still exposed to the
possibility of "paying" double the damages, while the employee may reap
double the recovery.
Furthermore, the brief mention of intentional tort in the bill does not solve
one of the major problems created by Brady: the illogical possibility of
workers' compensation recovery for an action that necessarily occurs outside of
the workplace. 147 Until this issue is resolved, neither the employer nor the
employee, neither the legislature nor the courts, may claim that the workers'
compensation system is truly reformed.
146 Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 730 (Ohio 1991) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (quoting Porter v. Oberlin, 205 N.E.2d 363, 364 (Ohio 1965)).
14 7 See supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Brady v. Safety-Keen Corp. illustrates the power struggle between the
Ohio General Assembly and the Ohio courts over workers' compensation. With
the Brady decision, the supreme court has sent the message that it will not be
bullied into maintaining some sort of balance between employers and
employees in workplace litigation. Brady represents yet another chip at the
foundation of workers' compensation. No longer is it an exclusive remedy. No
longer is the scale balanced. Indeed, unless the court and the legislature
compromise to enforce a statutory scheme consistent with the original quid pro
quo rationale, the future of workers' compensation as a viable insurance and
recovery system is doomed.
Erika L. Haupt
